Germany Is Buying a New Batch of Eurofighter Aircraft—Here’s Why
Germany unveiled its latest Tranche 4 Eurofighter Typhoon last week, suggesting that Berlin is making a hedge against Russian threats—and against uncertainty over Europe’s future fighter programs. The Eurofighter was expected to gradually give way to sixth-generation systems, most notably the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) intended as its replacement. Instead, as the FCAS program faces delays and disputes between its members, the Eurofighter is increasingly viewed as the foundation of future German air power—and is being upgraded accordingly.
The Eurofighter Typhoon’s Specifications
Year Introduced: 2003
Number Built: 609 (+ 7 prototypes)
Length: 15.96 m (52 ft 4 in)
Wingspan: 10.95 m (35 ft 11 in)
Weight: 23,500 kg (35,274 lb) MTOW
Engines: Two Eurojet EJ200 afterburning turbofan engines, 60 kN (13,500 lbf) thrust each dry
Top Speed: 2,495 km/h (1,550 mph), Mach 2.35
Combat Radius: 1,389 km (863 mi)
Service Ceiling: 16,764 m (55,000 ft)
Loadout: One 27mm Mauser BK-27 revolver cannon; 13 hardpoints (8 under wing, 5 under-fuselage pylon stations); 9,000 kg (19,800 lb) total payload capacity
Aircrew: 1-2, depending on variant
What’s in Germany’s Newest Eurofighters?
Germany ordered 38 Tranche 4 Eurofighter aircraft under Project Quadriga in 2020. Consisting of 31 single-seat aircraft and seven two-seat aircraft, the new order of Typhoons will replace the older Tranche 1 aircraft still in service with the German Luftwaffe. The order was part of a larger modernization effort also underway, with Germany planning for an additional 55 Eurofighters to replace the Tornado aircraft. And 20 Tranche 5 aircraft are expected to be ordered later.
The most significant technological change in Tranche 4 is the addition of the ECRS Mk 1 AESA radar. The Eurofighter has long lacked AESA capability, which was naturally viewed as a weakness against more modern jets. When compared with older mechanically scanned radars, AESA offers distinct advantages, like longer detection range, faster target tracking, better accuracy, stronger resistance to jamming, and simultaneous tracking of multiple targets. This is especially important against drones, low-flying cruise missiles, and reduced-signature targets. And because modern aircraft increasingly rewards the aircraft that sees and shoots first, better radar is vital for survival. The enhanced radar is also important because radar increasingly functions as a communications node, electronic warfare tool, and sensor fusion system.
Germany is also planning 15 Typhoon EK electronic warfare aircraft equipped with Saab’s Alexis EW suite and AGM-88E anti-radiation missiles. The EK-variants will be charged with finding and suppressing enemy air defenses, turning portions of the Eurofighter fleet into electronic attack aircraft, similar in concept to the EA-18G Growler.
Yet, Germany will not be replacing their entire fleet with the Eurofighter; Germany is also purchasing 35 F-35 Lightning II aircraft to serve an inter-NATO nuclear mission (using the B61-12 bomb) and long-range strikes. Accordingly, its emerging force structure includes the F-35A for stealth penetration, nuclear missions, and strike while the Eurofighter will be used for air superiority, electronic warfare, and broader multirole work.
FCAS Problems Mean More Work for the Eurofighter
What about the FCAS? Uncertainty around the future of FCAS is likely driving Germany’s Eurofighter and F-35A procurement, at least in part.
The FCAS was intended to produce a sixth-generation fighter, between a consortium of EU nations, a system of systems comparable to the American NGAD. But Germany and France have butted heads over program direction and industrial control. Germany may be unwilling to gamble their aerospace future on a delayed and hampered program; upgrading an existing aircraft program already in service may be the safer hedge. Ironically, the Eurofighter program may itself be a sign of things to come for the FCAS; it was conceived of as a joint European project between multiple nations in Western Europe, including France, but Paris withdrew from the program after design disagreements and developed the Dassault Rafale as a competitor. It is easy to imagine the FCAS meeting the same fate.
Strategically, the aircraft upgrades reflect that Germany is moving away from post-Cold War complacency, highlighted by low readiness and occasional expeditionary operations, towards something more capable of defending the eastern flank or executing long-range strike. The Tranche 4 purchase doesn’t appear just to be another fighter jet upgrade, but instead suggests Germany is becoming more serious about its defensive preparations, while holding deepening skepticism over the viability of the FCAS.
